Description:
U.S. Coast Guard blog describes today's global marine transportation challenges and the role Coast Guard, recreational boaters, and professional mariners have to protect maritime commerce, the marine environment, and safety of life at sea.
Contents:
McAlpine Lock Allision—a misaligned approach sets off a chain reaction
Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. By LCDR Phillip Ison, chief, Prevention Department, U.S. Coast Guard Sector Ohio Valley.
On January 26, 2006, while southbound on the Ohio River near Louisville, Ky., a towboat pushing three loaded asphalt barges during a period of high water attempted to enter the approach to the McAlpine lockway. It was a clear day with excellent visibility, but the pilot did not line up his approach correctly. The tow allided with the vane dike at the head of Portland Canal and the force of the blow snapped the barges’ connecting wires.
The tow broke apart, with each barge drifting downstream individually. Tugs attempted to recover all the barges before they drifted down to the dam, but two barges escaped this recovery effort and went over the dam. The first over was recovered. The second struck a railroad bridge sideways. Within a few minutes, the current forced the upstream edge of the barge down and flipped the barge onto its port side.
There it sat, 300 feet long, 54 feet wide, with 900,000 gallons of asphalt, heating oil, and diesel aboard, bottom pressed firmly against two bridge supports, its port side on the bottom of the river.
Over the next four months, the incident command worked as a cooperative group to address all aspects of the incident, from oil recovery to salvage, from site safety to cargo recovery. Conflicting concerns, needs, and recommendations were invariably resolved to the satisfaction of all parties.
Cargo offload was finally complete in late May 2006. The asphalt required re-heating before pumping could proceed, which involved cutting into the barge at each cargo tank and inserting heating coils. This was river-level dependent, and operations were suspended numerous times due to rising water levels. Once ready for removal, the barge was salvaged over a two-day period, using an A-frame crane to lift the barge while it was pulled away from the railroad bridge.
For more information:
Full article and “Focus on Safety” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2008 Vol. 65, Number 2” (Summer 2008).
Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.
Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.
Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.
Barge Break-aways—an ever-present risk
Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. By LT Matthew Meskun, chief, Prevention Department, U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Unit Pittsburgh, and CWO William Perkins, marine inspector/investigator, U.S. Coast Guard Sector Upper Mississippi River.
Because of their efficiency, barges are the primary commercial cargo transportation mode. Unfortunately, from time to time, barges can break free from their mooring or towing arrangements and are swept down the river, potentially wreaking havoc to the river system until they are either corralled by assisting towing vessels or salvaged (if the barges have sunk).
For example, this picture shows what’s left of a hopper barge after an allision with the Eads Bridge in 2005. The vessel was traveling southbound on the upper Mississippi River as part of a 15-barge tow when it hit a bridge and broke away from the tow.
 Barge Break-away Locations
There are two primary locations where barge break-aways occur: either at a fleeting area facility, or from a towing vessel underway.
Many factors can contribute to a barge break-away that originates from a fleeting area, such as impact from large items floating downriver, high winds and current, rapid changes in water levels, or human error. Break-aways may also occur when other barges hit the fleeting area.
Normally when a barge breaks from a towing vessel underway, the tow hits some drift or other obstruction. This collision then breaks the wire gear holding the barges together as a unit. This event can also cause a chain reaction, as the break-away barges can hit other barges further down the river.
Barge Break-away Prevention
Federal regulatory bodies, river industry associations, working groups, and companies have all taken active roles to promote methods that reduce barge break-aways. For example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) oversees the location and placement of each fleeting area facility. Each fleeting area operator is required to submit a fleeting area operations manual that provides detailed information and procedures for a river’s different stages and conditions.
Coast Guard Marine Safety Unit (MSU) Pittsburgh has created additional preventive measures that have been adopted by other Coast Guard units on the Western Rivers. One very successful outreach effort is an annual barge break-away seminar that highlights the importance of properly maintaining the fleet in order to prevent barge break-aways.
Another initiative that MSU Pittsburgh spearheaded is random fleeting area facility inspections, conducted with USACE partners. The joint inspection teams visit fleeting facilities to:
- check the condition of the materials used to secure the barges,
- ascertain overall worker safety efforts,
- verify training practices,
- affirm the use and currency of the approved fleeting area operations manual.
Barge Break-away Response
Coast Guard response to a barge break-away notification typically seeks to mitigate any hazard to navigation. The operations specialist standing radio watch in the sector command center receives the notification and issues an urgent marine information broadcast to alert all vessels in the area of the barge break-away and to request assistance from any available vessels in the area.
Once the situation is under control and all hazards have been removed, the Coast Guard will stop all operations at the source of the break-away. The operator of the responsible fleeting area will be required to investigate and determine the cause of the break-away, and submit a proposal on how to rectify the discrepancy to prevent a similar reoccurrence.
The Western Rivers system is a vital part of America’s economy, and preventing barge break-aways on it is critical. The industry, USACE, and the Coast Guard are working to ensure that the inland river transportation system remains open and free-flowing for the efficient trade and movement of commerce. For more information: Full article and “Focus on Safety” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2008 Vol. 65, Number 2” (Summer 2008). Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp. Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.
Measuring the Economic Impact of Marine Casualties
 Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. By CAPT Denise L. Matthews, former commanding officer, U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Unit Paducah; LTC Steven J. Roemhildt, Nashville District engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; and LCDR Thomas J. Kaminski, former supervisor, U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Detachment Nashville.
On August 3, 2006, a tank barge carrying 20,000 barrels of mixed xylene was damaged while locking upbound through Wilson Lock and Dam (L/D) in Florence, Ala. The towing vessel M/V Potomac was pushing the jumbo barge (297 feet by 54 feet), HTCO-3016, at the time of the incident. As the lock chamber filled, the barge came into contact with the upper lock gate, dislocating it from its track. As this upper gate fell back into place, the barge became wedged beneath it, as seen in the picture.
For more than four months, local, state, and federal agencies worked closely to safely remove the damaged tank barge and repair and reinstall the damaged lock gate. They also had to manage constantly changing vessel queues to minimize economic impact to the marine transportation system, its suppliers, and customers.
The Response
The actions taken following this major marine casualty exemplify the interagency coordination and teamwork required for effective and efficient marine transportation system recovery on the inland waterways. During the emergency response and prolonged post-emergency phases of this incident, key stakeholder issues included:
- potential pollution,
- possible toxicity and explosion hazards,
- resumption of safe navigation and normal locking operations,
- repair of the main lock chamber,
- waterways safety/security,
- economic impact due to lock delays.
By late afternoon on August 3, a unified command was established that included senior representatives from Coast Guard Marine Safety Unit Paducah, TVA, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE is the operator of the lock and dam), the Florence Fire Department, and Maryland Marine Inc. (owner of barge HTCO-3016). The initial objectives of the unified command were protecting the community, responders, and maritime industry; safely securing and removing HTCO-3016 from under the lock gate; and beginning operation of the Wilson auxiliary lock to keep barges moving through the area.
Barge Removal
USACE also began construction of a temporary dam and a support structure for the damaged lock gate. Since the dislocated and damaged lock gate was sitting atop—and therefore supported by—the damaged barge, the plan was to pump out water to lower the barge, thereby transferring the lock gate’s weight to the newly constructed support. On August 5, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers completed the removal of HTCO-3016.
Restoring Traffic
On the morning of August 6, USACE reopened the auxiliary lock to commercial vessel traffic, which had grown to seven towing vessels and 90 barges awaiting lockage. By the afternoon of August 9, the vessel queue had increased to 15 towing vessels and 139 barges loaded with a variety of cargoes.
Economic Impact
The significant decrease in Wilson L/D’s ability to lock commercial vessel traffic resulted in significant economic impact to the towboat industry and the Tennessee River marine transportation system—approximately $29 million. Additional costs were prevented due to outstanding stakeholder cooperation.
Stakeholder Communication and Cooperation
On August 8, the MSD Nashville supervisor attended a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers briefing where USACE expressed its understanding and concern for the economic impact this incident would have on the river industry.
In general, USACE used “first-in, first-out” prioritization to lock barges but also requested representatives to serve on an industry-led queue management board to help make decisions on priority lockage requests. Priority lockage decisions were made based on type/amount of cargo and impact on industry.
On August 17, USACE removed the damaged lock gate, and on August 18 commenced use of the temporary caisson configured for main gate lockage. USACE then began weekly teleconferences to communicate lock repair, vessel queue status, and caisson-use schedules to the Coast Guard, TVA, and industry stakeholders. This process continued until the damaged main chamber lock gate was repaired and reinstalled. Wilson L/D resumed normal operations on December 5.
For more information: Full article and “Focus on Safety” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2008 Vol. 65, Number 2” (Summer 2008). Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp. Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp. Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.
Safety is at Our Core
 Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. By ADM Thad Allen, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard.
One of the Coast Guard’s greatest strengths is our multi-mission character. It allows us to conduct a wide range of functions in the maritime domain, from marine safety, to law enforcement and national defense, to environmental protection and humanitarian response. The Coast Guard has accrued these roles and missions over two centuries of service because these duties serve a collective good and are most efficiently and effectively accomplished by a single federal maritime force.
Our marine safety mission remains the bedrock of the Coast Guard’s value to the nation, and it underpins our security and environmental stewardship programs. This focus on safety pervades all of our mission areas; it is woven into the very fabric of our service, and is the ultimate focus of all we do.
We secure our ports and waterways to keep America safe from terrorist attack, safe from the ravages of illegal drugs, and safe from unlawful entry of any kind. We protect the world’s oceans and our living marine resources. In the event of any natural or man-made disaster, we act to ensure the safety of our citizens and to remove them from harm’s way.
The U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety & Security Council supports these missions, and its members direct and drive these efforts. Our operational model is flexible, adaptive, efficient, and capable of succeeding with innumerable maritime scenarios. This positions the Coast Guard to meet a broad range of national interests.
As we seek to continually improve maritime safety, we will also strive to balance each of our essential mission requirements. Coast Guard men and women serve across the nation and around the world keeping people safe, ports secure, and our waters protected. For hundreds of years, we’ve been there when the nation needed us most. While we live in a changing world, one thing is certain: Marine safety will forever be at our core.
We will be sharing examples of this sentiment in action in the next series of blogs, excerpted from the “Focus on Safety” issue of Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine.
For more information:
Full article and “Focus on Safety” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2008 Vol. 65, Number 2” (Summer 2008).
Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.
Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.
Lessons Learned – Fire Aboard a Cruise Ship, Part II
Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. To read Part I, please see our Nov. 3 post.
Lessons learned from marine casualty reports are regularly featured in Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine. These articles explore marine incidents and the causal factors, outline the subsequent casualty investigation, and describe the lessons learned as a result.
As the fire raged aboard the cruise ship, four couples struggled for survival:
Rooms A344 and A320: The two married couples in these rooms encountered a closed fire screen as they attempted to escape, and became separated. One wife assumed her husband had made it to safety when she heard a door slam shut ahead of her. Both wives escaped.
Between 3:44 and 4:02 a.m., the engine fire party recovered the male passenger of room A320 in that alleyway. They pulled the semi-conscious man to safety, and he survived.
Just 30 feet away, the party found the male of room A344. Though he, too, was quickly transported to safety, where a medical party quickly came to assist, they found he had stopped breathing, had no pulse, and could not be revived.
Room A402: This married couple was able to escape their stateroom, but the elderly man suffered a respiratory arrest and collapsed on his way to their muster station. He was later recovered and taken to safety.
Room A340: This couple was trapped in their room, unable to get through when calling 911. The fire party evacuated them.
Of 2,690 passengers and the 1,123 crewmembers, there was one casualty. The autopsy of the man in room A344 reported his immediate cause of death was asphyxia, secondary to inhalation of smoke and irrespirable gases. Another 13 passengers and four crewmembers were treated for smoke inhalation.
The Aftermath
The cruise ship in this casualty seemed to be doing everything it should be. The ship was up to code and following the required regulations. Additionally, the crew’s quick and decisive actions prevented the situation from becoming worse.
There was no evidence that accelerants were used to intentionally set the fire, and the only electrical fittings on the balcony were the enclosed light fittings above the balcony doors. The damage to the light fittings was consistent with exposure to an external heat source; there was no evidence of arcing or failure.
The most likely source of ignition was a discarded cigarette. It was determined that the fire probably smoldered for about 20 minutes before flames developed.
Although passengers aboard the cruise ship were instructed to properly extinguish cigarettes in ash trays during a safety video shown throughout the day on embarkation, as well as in stateroom safety literature, rules such as these are not always followed.
 Updated Regulations
After the fire, the International Council of Cruise Lines published a safety notice with recommended practices for balcony fire safety. IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee also initiated urgent measures to address cruise ship balcony fire safety, which were adopted just nine months after the fire.
Under the new amendments, partitions separating balconies must be constructed of non-combustible materials. Furniture on cabin balconies must be of restricted fire risk unless fixed fire extinguishing systems, fixed fire detection, and fire alarm systems are fitted to the balconies. The photo shows polycarbonate balcony partitions, plastic furniture, and polyurethane deck tiles after the fire. These materials were highly combustible and produced very thick black smoke.
Lessons Learned
In this case, not even the most experienced maritime organizations thought of every possible scenario, as evidenced by the lack of regulations regarding balcony materials.
Perhaps this example will provide food for thought by prompting all vessel owners to evaluate whether all areas of their vessels are safe, what potential problems may arise, and whether the persons aboard are ready to respond to emergencies at all times.
Full article is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and “2008 Volume 65, Number 2” (Summer 2008).
Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp. Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp
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